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Abstract
The regional economic integration that ensues from the ASEAN Economy Community will not
only provide its members with boundless opportunities for economic growth, but also with
unprecedented challenges. The demands of a more interconnected regional economy will
requirethe Indonesian government, as guardians of the competitive process in the Indonesian
market, to protect it from anticompetitive conduct occurring both within and outside of its borders.
However, there is a major gap since Indonesia’s current competition law does not provide the
KPPU with the jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, or punish violations committed by business
actors located outside of Indonesia’s territory. Thus, this paper examines the implementation of
the extraterritoriality principle to enable the KPPU and Indonesian courts to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign business actors who violate Indonesia’s competition law from abroad. This paper
employs a comparative approach to analyze the development of the extraterritoriality principle in
the US’s, EU’s, Singapore’s, and Malaysia’s competition laws. This article concludes by determining
how the extraterritoriality principle should be implemented to strengthen Indonesia’s competition
law enforcement.
Keywords: competition law, extraterritoriality principle, comparative legal research
Abstrak
Integrasiekonomi regional yang terjadi melalui Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN akanmemberikan
para negara anggotanya tidak hanya kesempatan untuk pertumbuhan ekonomi yang besar,
namun tantangan yang besar pula. Ekonomi regional yang semakin saling terhubung ini akan
menuntut pemerintah Indonesia, sebagai penjaga proses persaingan dalam pasar Indonesia,
untuk melindunginya dari perbuatan anti persaingan yang berasal baik dari dalam maupun
dari luar wilayahnya. Sementara, ada ketidakselarasan karena rezim hukum persaingan
usaha yang sekarang berlaku di Indonesia tidak memberikan wewenang kepada KPPU untuk
menginvestigasi, menindak maupun menghukum pelanggaran yang dilakukan oleh pelakuusaha
yang beradadiluar wilayah Indonesia. Oleh karena itu, makalah ini mengkaji penerapan asas
ekstra teritorialitas untuk memungkinkan KPPU dan Pengadilan Indonesia untuk memiliki
yurisdiksi terhadap pelakuusaha asing yang melanggar hukum persaingan usaha Indonesia
dari luar negeri. Makalah ini akan meggunakan pendekatan komparatif untuk menganalisa
perkembangan asas ekstra teritorialitas pada hukum persaingan Amerika Serikat, Uni Eropa,
Singapura dan Malaysia. Makalah ini akan ditutup dengan menyimpulkan bagaimana asas
ekstra teritorialitas sebaiknya diterapkan untuk memperkuat penegakan hukum persaingan
usaha di Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By the end of 2015, the Member States of ASEAN entered a new historic phase in
their economic and trade development. This is because at the 27th ASEAN Summit, the
ten ASEAN countries agreed to increase economic integration in the ASEAN region
through an economic cooperation called the “ASEAN Economic Community” (AEC).1This
economic integration through the aEC reflects the Member states’ collective effort
to reduce the existing trade barriers between them, such as tariffs (duties imposed
on imported goods/services), quotas (quantitative restrictions imposed on imported
goods/services) and non-tariff barriers (other trade restrictions not in the form of
duties, such as licensing requirements).2
in pursuit of that goal, the asEan Member states formulated five main pillars for
the AEC in the “AEC Blueprint 2025” that they will strive to accomplish by the year
2025: “(i) A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy; (ii) A Competitive, Innovative, and
Dynamic ASEAN; (iii) Enhanced Connectivity and Sectoral Cooperation; (iv) A Resilient,
Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-Centered ASEAN; and (v) A Global ASEAN.”3
this economic integration entails significant consequences, especially for trade
and business activities in the ASEAN region. The most obvious among them is that
competition between business entities will no longer be constrained by State borders.
Rather, business entities will become trans-national in nature due to the reduction of
trade barriers between the ASEAN nations. From the perspective of competition law,
this also means that the relevant markets for business entities would no longer be
limited to domestic markets; instead, it is highly likely that an entity’s relevant market
could encompass more than one country in the ASEAN region. Therefore, the more a
business entity expands its activities in the ASEAN region, the more likely it is that
their business decisions and policies in one country could result in anticompetitive
effects in another country.
With that in mind, the question that policy makers and competition law experts
in Indonesia must answer is this: Is our competition law regime ready to face the
challenges that may come from the AEC, especially from preventing anti-competitive
actions that may arise from business entities located outside of Indonesia?
Unfortunately, with the existing legal norms in Indonesia’s current competition law
legislation,4 the answer is that we are not ready.
Why is this so? This is because normatively, the Commission for the Supervision
of Business Competition’s (KPPU) scope of jurisdiction only encompasses
anticompetitive actions that are conducted by business entities operating within
indonesia’s territory. this is evident in the way in which law no.5 of 1999 defines
the term “business actors”–as entities which are “established and domiciled or who
conduct activities within the jurisdiction of the state of the Republic of Indonesia.”5
this narrow definition significantly impedes the KPPu’s enforcement efforts because
1
ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Economic Community”, https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/,
accessed on 25 October 2018.
2
Runckel, Christopher W., “Asia Opportunities: Asean Economic Community (AEC) in 2015”, http://
www.business-in-asia.com/asia/asean_economic_community.html accessed on 25 October 2018.
3
supra (n 1).
4
Indonesia, Undang-Undangtentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat
(Law regarding the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition),UU No. 5 Tahun
1999.
5
Ibid, Art. 1(5).
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the KPPU does not currently have the authority to investigate or prosecute foreign
business actors located outside of Indonesia who commit anticompetitive actions,
even when such actions cause adverse effects to the Indonesian economy.
When we relate this information to the economic integration of AEC, it is
necessary for Indonesia to consider expanding the scope of the KPPU’s jurisdiction so
that it will be able to protect Indonesia’s economy from the anticompetitive actions
of foreign business actors. What we can learn from other states who are members
of an economic community is that this can be done by incorporating the principle
of extraterritoriality into the competition law regime. For instance, following the
economic and political integration of the European Union, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) incorporated the extraterritoriality principle into EU competition law
since 1972 through the Dyestuffs case.6
Indonesia has taken some positive steps in this direction, as we can see in the
draft bill for the amendment to Law No. 5 of 1999 (“Antimonopoly Bill”).7The
Antimonopoly Bill expands the scope of the KPPU’s jurisdiction so that it can enforce
Indonesia’s competition law with business actors located abroad. This is based on the
re-formulation of the “business actors” definition, which now includes those entities
who conduct economic activities “inside as well as outside of the territory of the Republic
of Indonesia, which has an effect on the Indonesian economy.”8 Unfortunately, however,
the elucidation of the phrase “which has an effect” as a condition for the application
of the extraterritoriality principle is nowhere to be found in the Antimonopoly Bill.
This issue must be investigated further, because based on the existing literature,
there are several variations to the implementation of the extraterritoriality principle.
This situation has worsened due to the fact that ASEAN does not have any law binding
its member states to implement such a principle. Therefore, this research will conduct
a comparative study of the application of the extraterritoriality principle in the US,
Eu, and other asEan jurisdictions in order to find the right approach for indonesia.
Before proceeding to the analysis, this paper shall further elaborate on three main
concepts; namely, the ASEAN Economic Community, the enforcement of Indonesian
competition law, and the extraterritoriality principle.
A. ASEAN Economic Community
1. Overview of ASEAN Economic Community
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was established based on Bali Concord
II in 2003. This declaration established three pillars of the ASEAN Community;
namely, political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural
cooperation.9 The purpose of the AEC’s establishment is to create a single market and
production base, as well as to create complementary opportunities for business.10 In
accomplishing such objectives, the ASEAN countries plan to initiate new mechanisms
such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
(AFAS), and the ASEAN Investment Area; it also plans to accelerate regional
integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled
6

Case C-48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Limited v. Commission [1972] E.C.R. 619.
Indonesia, Draft Bill for the Amendment of Law No. 5 of 1999 (March 2014 version).
8
Ibid, Art. 1(4).
9
ASEAN, “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)”, https://asean.org/?static_
post=declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii, last accessed 20 October 2018.
10
Ibid.
7
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labor, and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including
the improvement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism.11
The economic cooperation among ASEAN countries are to be conducted in the
areas of trade in goods, trade in services, investments, intellectual property rights, and
capital mobility.12 The ASEAN Economic Ministers High Level Task Force on Economic
Integration published the following initiatives to foster economic integration:13
a. Fast-track integration of 11 priority-sectors;
b. faster customs clearance and simplified custom procedures;
c. Elimination of barriers to trade;
d. Accelerated implementation of Mutual Recognition Arrangements for key sectors
(e.g., electrical and electronic equipment and telecommunications equipment);
and
e. Harmonization of standards and technical regulations.
The countries also agreed to accelerate 11 priority sectors for integration to be
coordinated by each member, as follows:
Table 2.1
Priority Integration Sectors14
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Country
Indonesia
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

Priority Sector
Wood-based products; automotive;
Rubber-based products; textiles and apparels;
argo-based products; fisheries;
Electronics;
e-ASEAN; healthcare;
Air travel; tourism.

Even though the plan to establish the AEC was created in 2003, it was not until 31
December 2015 that it was formally established. Its establishment was then followed
by the AEC Blueprint 2025, which was adopted at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, which is focused on:15
a. A highly integrated and cohesive economy;
b. A competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN;
c. Enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation;
d. A resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people-centered ASEAN; and
e. A global ASEAN.
In 2018, several ASEAN countries made progress. In terms of trade and customsrelated documents, five asEan countries (indonesia, Malaysia, singapore, thailand,
and Vietnam) started to apply the ASEAN Single Window (ASW), where the preferential
11

Ibid.
ASEAN, “Recommendation of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration”,https://
asean.org/?static_post=recommendations-of-the-high-level-task-force-on-asean-economic-integration,
last accessed 20 October 2018.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
ASEAN, Asean Economic Community (AEC), https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/7c.May-2017-Factsheet-on-AEC.pdf,retrieved 20 October 2018.
12
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tariff duty can now be granted based on electronic data exchanged through the ASW
gateway.16 While trade-in-goods showed a significant improvement in early 2018,
integration into the trade-in-services is still under negotiation. The AFAS has been
finalized and is targeted for signing by the asEan Economic Ministers later in 2018.17
Meanwhile, in terms of e-commerce, efforts to intensify the negotiations for an ASEAN
Agreement on Electronic Commerce is a targeted priority deliverable in 2017, or at
the latest 2018.18
2. AEC and Competition law
In order to create a competitive ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on
Competition Policy was circulated in 2010. This policy is not legally binding to ASEAN
member states. It serves as a living reference or set of recommendations for the
members. It introduces both competition policy and competition law. The former is
expected to increase market competitiveness at the practical level, while the latter
provides the market with a set of “rules of the game” meant to protect the competition
process itself.19
The guideline urges the ASEAN member states to have a Competition Regulatory
Body and legislation on Competition in place by 2015. This is because not every
ASEAN member state had either a regulatory body or competition law back in 2010.
Those who already had existing competition laws are encouraged to consider and
review the existing legislation on existing regulations for intellectual property
rights, fair trading, sectoral rules/regulations, and consumer protection laws.20 The
guideline also suggests implementing the competition law in phases. Member states
are encouraged to introduce the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and
dominant positions; meanwhile, the prohibition of anti-competitive mergers can be
introduced last due to its complexity.21
Chapter 5 of the guideline recommends that member states choose to adopt basic
legislation containing broad provisions and introduce the implementing regulations
later on. It also suggests that the government conduct public hearings before drafting
and finally implementing regulations. Most importantly, the guideline suggests that
member countries accommodate provisions relating to extra-territorial application
of competition law,22 which Indonesia has not yet applied even now.
In 2016, the ASEAN Competition Action Plan or ACAP 2025 was released. The plan
translates strategic measures found in the AEC Blueprint, and was established to set
out the aEC’s goals in the field of competition law and policy for the period between
2016 and 2025.23It provides details on the strategic goals, initiatives, and outcomes
on competition policy and law in ASEAN.
it contains five strategic goals, namely:
16
AEC Monitoring, “Updates on the AEC for November 2017 to June 2018”,AEC Monitoring, http://
aecmonitoring.asean.org/2018/06/30/aec-updates-november-2017-june-2018/, last accessed 20 October 2018.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
ASEAN, 2010, ASEAN Regional Guideline on Competition Policy, The ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, p. 3.
20
Ibid, p. 22.
21
Ibid. p.23.
22
Chapter 5.1.3.2, Ibid., p.21.
23
Ong, Burton, ed. The Regionalisation of Competition Law and Policy Within the ASEAN Economic
Community. Cambridge University Press, 2018, p.26-27.
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a. Establish effective competition regimes in all ASEAN member states;
b. Strengthen the capacities of competition-related agencies in ASEAN member
states to effectively implement Competition Policy and Law (CPL);
c. Ensure that regional cooperation arrangements on CPL are in place;
d. Foster a competition-aware ASEAN region; and
e. Move toward greater harmonization of CPL in ASEAN.
Each goal is further elaborated on and supported by initiatives and outcomes that make
the plans more feasible. The ASEAN Experts Group on Competition will oversee
the implementation of ACAP 2025 in cooperation with other ASEAN sectoral
bodies and relevant stakeholders.24However, producing an ASEAN competition
policy will prove difficult without a clear set of objectives by each member state
as well as supranational legal or institutional frameworks. Thus, ACAP 2025 only
applies to encourage the development of a regional competition framework and
only acts to demonstrate the commitment and interest by the member states who
want develop such a framework.25
B. Competition Law Enforcement in Indonesia
1. The Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition
Before Law No. 5/1999 was enacted, the development of competition policy was
not a significant objective of the indonesian government.26 However, similar to other
Asian countries, Indonesia suffered an economic crisis in 1997.27 To resolve this crisis,
Indonesia signed a Letter of Intent on July 29, 1998with the International Monetary
Fund in order to receive a rescue loan from the institute.28 The rescue loan carried
conditions that among other things required the Indonesian Government to pass
laws and regulations to ensure fair competition and consumer protection as well
as the governance and enforcement of such laws.29Subsequently, Law No. 5/1999
was developed with the objective of safeguarding the public interest and improving
national economic efficiency30 as well as upholding the rule of law and providing
equal protection to every business actor to allow fair business competition.31 The
formulation of the law was based on the principles set out in the Pancasila as well as
the 1945 Constitution; it is based primarily on the principles of economic democracy.32
Indonesia possesses essentially only one institution to enforce Law No. 5 of 1999;
namely, the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU), a
quasi-judicial institution which was established pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
24
ASEAN, “AN ASEAN Competition Action Plan”,ASEAN, https://asean.org/storage/2012/05/ACAPWebsite-23-December-2016.pdf, last accessed 21 October 2018.
25
Ong, Loc. Cit.
26
Sirait, NingrumNatasya. “The development and progress of competition law in Indonesia”. The Antitrust Bulletin 54, no. 1 (2009), p.19.
27
Ibid.
28
Pasaribu, Manaek SM. Challenges of Indonesian Competition Law and Some Suggestions for Improvement. No. DP-2016-04. 2016, p.2.
29
Pangestu, Mari, HaryoAswicahyono, Titak Anas, and Dionisius Ardyanto. “The evolution of competition policy in Indonesia”. Review of Industrial Organization 21, no. 2 (2002), p.214.
30
Pasaribu, Op. Cit., p.1.
31
Elucidation of Law No. 5/1999.
32
Ibid.
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75/199933 as an independent entity under the President responsible for supervising
the implementation of Law No. 5 of 1999.34On the other hand, the District Court and
Supreme Court act as a means of remedy for KPPU decisions.35 The District Court
has the authority to handle appeals of KPPU decisions and criminal cases that result
from the non-execution of a KPPU decision. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court handles
cassation of District Court decisions.36
The KPPU is tasked with: (1) Evaluating agreements that may result in monopolistic
practices or unfair business competition; (2) Evaluating business activities and/or
business actors’ behaviors that may result in monopolistic practices or unfair business
competition; (3) Evaluating whether there exists a misuse of dominant position that
may result in monopolistic practices or unfair business competition; (4) Taking
action according to its authority under Article 36; (5) Providing recommendations
and considerations for Government policy relating to monopolistic practices or unfair
business competition; (6)Compiling guidelines and/or publications relating to Law
No. 5 of 1999; and (7) Providing periodic reports of its work results to the President
and House of Representatives.37
In implementing the aforementioned tasks, the KPPU has the authority to: (1)
Receive reports from the public and/or business actors on allegations of monopoly
practices or unfair competition; (2) Conduct research on allegations of business
activities that result in monopolistic practices or unfair competition; (3) Conduct
investigations and/or examinations into allegations reported by the public or
discovered by the KPPU during research or monitoring; (4) Decide on the results of
its investigations and/or hearings; (5) Summon business actors that have allegedly
violated Law No. 5 of 1999; (6) Summon and invite witnesses, expert witnesses
and any persons with knowledge of the violation; (7) Seek assistance from related
institutions to invite business actors, witnesses, expert witnesses or persons that
are not willing to appear upon invitation; (8) Request information from Government
institutions on investigations and/or examinations.38

2. Investigation and Examination by the KPPU
During investigation, the KPPU is prohibited from investigating cases that involve
criminal elements.39 Instead, cases with criminal elements are investigated by the
police and prosecuted by the public prosecutor in the district court.40 The KPPU has
the authority to conduct investigations and examinations upon two grounds. The
first is upon receiving a report. Here investigation is initiated upon a report received
from an aggrieved member of the public or business actor as a result of the actions
of the reported business actor. The second is the KPPU’s initiative upon the suspicion
33
Indonesia, PutusanPresidententangKomisiPengawasPersaingan Usaha (Presidential Decree on the
Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition), PP No. 75 Tahun 1999.
34
Hermansyah. Pokok-pokokHukumPersaingan Usaha Di Indonesia. Rawamangun, Jakarta: KencanaPrenada Media Group, 2008.
35
Rizkiyana, Rikrik. Competition Law in Indonesia. Singapore: LexisNexis, 2014.
36
Ibid.
37
Indonesia, Undang-UndangtentangLaranganPraktekMonopoli dan Persaingan Usaha TidakSehat
(Law regarding the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition),UU No. 5 Tahun
1999, (“Law No. 5 of 1999”) Article 35.
38
Ibid, Article 36.
39
Juwana, Hikmahanto. “An Overview of Indonesia's Antimonopoly Law”. Wash. U. Global Stud. L.
Rev. 1 (2002): 185.
40
Ibid.

Volume 9 Number 1 , January - April 2019 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

~ 34 ~

MUHAMMAD RIFKY WICAKSONO

of any violation of Law No. 5 of 1999.41In either of these circumstances, the KPPU
establishes a panel afterwards for the purpose of investigating and examining the
reported business actor.42 Examination by the KPPU is divided into two stages. The
first stage is preliminary examination. Preliminary examination is conducted upon
receiving a report; this stage determines whether the case can proceed to the next
stage. The second stage is advanced examination. This stage is conducted whenever
the KPPu finds indications of monopoly practices or unfair competition.
C. Extraterritoriality Principle
andrew d. Mitchell defines extraterritoriality as a condition where a state has
the authority to apply its jurisdiction and domestic laws to a person or legal entity
located outside of its territory.43The polar opposite of this doctrine is the principle of
territoriality, which states that a country only has the authority to create and enforce
laws with legal entities situated inside its territorial jurisdiction.44 As mentioned,
the problem that the KPPU currently faces in enforcing Indonesia’s competition law
is that, based on a textual interpretation, Law No. 5 of 1999 adopts the principle of
territoriality. Thus, normatively speaking, the KPPU is not permitted to investigate,
prosecute, or punish a foreign business actor who violates Indonesia’s competition
law unless they establish a subsidiary that is incorporated under Indonesian law.
Even then, KPPU’s jurisdiction would cover punishing only the subsidiary.
Interestingly, however, in the development of jurisprudence for competition law
cases in Indonesia, there are three cases where the KPPU had to answer the question
of whether Law No. 5 of 1999 applies to legal entities established under foreign laws
that are domiciled outside of Indonesia :the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC)45case,
the Temasek case,46 and the Astro case.47
the question on the extraterritorial application of law no. 5 of 1999 first arose in
the VLCC case. In that case, the KPPU decided that PT Equinox together with Goldman
Sachs Pte and Frontline Ltd. had colluded with PT Pertamina (Persero) in the sale of
VLCC’s tanker ship to Frontline Ltd.The question regarding the extraterritorial nature
of Indonesia’s competition law arose in that case because both Goldman Sachs Pte and
Frontline Ltd were business actors established and domiciled outside of Indonesia’s
territory (Singapore and Bermuda Islands, respectively). Although both companies
were foreign entities, the KPPU still punished both Frontline and Goldman Sachs
because both business actors were involved in a tender conducted by Pertamina
in indonesia, and their tender collusion resulted in a loss to the state’s finances up
to as much as USD 54 million.48 In the VLCC case, KPPU’s ratio legis to extend their
jurisdiction was based on a simple premise: since the delict (tender collusion)49 was
conducted in Indonesia’s territory, then the KPPU has the jurisdiction to prosecute
41
Lubis, Andi Fahmi, et al. HukumPersaingan Usaha BukuTeks, Indonesia: KomisiPengawasPersaingan
Usaha (KPPU), 2017.
42
Ibid.
43
Mitchell, Andrew D. “Broadening the Vision of Trade Liberalisation”. World Competition 24 (2001):
343.
44
Ibid.
45
KPPU. “Decision No. 07/KPPU-L/2004.”
46
KPPU. “Decision No. 07/KPPU-L/2007.”
47
KPPU. “Decision No. 03/KPPU-L/2008.”
48
Toha,Kurnia. ‘Extraterritorial Applicability of Indonesia Business Competition Law As An Efforts
Dealing ASEAN Single Market’, JurnalDinamika Hukum15 (2015): 3
49
Law No. 5 of 1999, Art. 22
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and punish the business actors who are guilty of the violation.
the more difficult question occurs if the foreign business actors are not within
Indonesia’s territory when the anticompetitive agreement or action takes place. This
is the question that the KPPU had to answer in the Temasek case. In that case, the
Temasek Group (established and located in Singapore) was said to have violated
Article 27(a) of Law No. 5 of 1999 because they had a cross-shareholding ownership
over the shares of PT Telkomsel and PT Indosat, which caused anticompetitive effects
in Indonesia’s telecommunications industry. This happened because, through its
subsidiary called STT,the Temasek Group owned 41.94% of PT Indosat’s shares, while
through its subsidiary called Singtel, it owned 35% of PT Telkomsel’s shares.
In its objection, Temasek argued that the KPPU did not have the jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish Temasek because not only are they not domiciled under
Indonesian law, but they also do not conduct any direct business activities in
indonesia. Hence, they argued that they do not fall under the definition of a “business
actor” under Article 1(5) of Law No. 5 of 1999. To rebut such arguments, the KPPU
“borrowed” the doctrine of the “Single Economic Entity” from EU competition law.
Based on this doctrine, a parent company and its subsidiary can be considered a
single economic entity if the parent company has “decisive influence” over the actions
of its subsidiary.50 As a consequence, the KPPU held that the foreign business entity
“can be held liable towards the actions of other business actors who are part of a single
economic entity […] hence, Indonesia’s competition law can possess extraterritorial
jurisdiction in such cases.”51According to that reasoning, the KPPU determined that
Temasek was guilty.
Similarly, the principle of extraterritoriality was applied in the case commonly
referred to as the Astro Television case.52 The case concerned PT Direct Vision
(PDTV),a reported party domiciled in Indonesia; Astro All Asia Networks PC (AAAN),
another reported party domiciled in Malaysia; ESPN STAR Sports (ESS), domiciled in
Singapore; and All Asia Multimedia Networks (AAMN), domiciled in the United Arab
Emirates.
In this case, the KPPU found that AAAN was in violation of Article 16 of Law No.
5/1999, which prohibits business actors from entering into agreements that may cause
unfair business competition or monopolistic practices with business actors overseas.
The agreement in question was between AAMN and ESS, and contained a clause on the
broadcasting distribution of the Barclays Premiere League, and the appointment of a
TV operator in Indonesia. The KPPU found that based on the Single Economic Entity
Doctrine, the AAMN had conducted its activities in the territory of Indonesia. This was
based on the fact that AAMN obtained content, created channels in Indonesian and
Malaysian to be supplied to a paid TV operator, and procured decoders supplied to
PDTV in Indonesia. It should be emphasized that the Commission disagreed with the
initial analysis on the implementation of the Single Economic Entity Doctrine by the
investigative team, thus highlighting the urgency of regulating uniform and consistent
provisions concerning extraterritoriality under Indonesian competition law.
Having said that, this paper will analyze and outline two things: first, how courts
in jurisdictions such as the EU, the US, and other ASEAN countries develop and
50
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implement the extraterritoriality principle in their competition law regime; and
second, what approach should be used in Indonesia’s Antimonopoly Bill to implement
the extraterritoriality principle to strengthen enforcement of Indonesia’s competition
law.

III.DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE
COMPETITION LAW OF DEVELOPED JURISDICTIONS
C. Development of the Extraterritoriality Principle in US Antitrust Law
In explaining the development of the extraterritoriality principle in US Antitrust
law, we will first analyze the development of judicial decisions and later follow up
with the development of legislations in the US.
the first discussion of the extraterritoriality principle in the us dates back to 1909.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruits Co.,53 a suit was brought for alleged conspiracy
to monopolize production and exportation of bananas to the US. However, the Judge
adopted a restrictive approach by stating that the wrongful acts occurred outside the
US, as the legality of the act “must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done,”54 and that US antitrust law was intended to be “confined in its operation
and effect to the territorial limits” of the lawmaker.55 Such a restrictive approach was
soon abandoned in 1927, where in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,56 the Supreme
Court held jurisdiction over an alleged conspiracy wherein US companies conspired
with Mexican companies to monopolize the import of sisal plants. the court justified
this different approach as the act “brought about forbidden results within the United
States” and that the act was made effective by a US company.57
In 1945, in the United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),58 the Court
introduced a new conceptual test known as the “effects doctrine.” Here, the court
discussed the issue of violations of the Sherman Act through the execution of an
international aluminum cartel from corporations originating in Canada, Germany,
and Switzerland. The concept of the “effects doctrine” was introduced, in which,
according to Judge Learned Hand, “any State may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which has consequences within
its borders.”59 This doctrine not only requires that there are consequences in the US,
but also that there is intent to cause such consequences.60
However, while this “effects doctrine” was rapidly accepted in the US,61the Alcoa
judgment was criticized by foreign governments and scholars due to its failure to
consider potential foreign sovereignty interference and international comity. In Hilton
v. Guyot,62 the us supreme Court defined international comity as “the recognition
53
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which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens.”63 This very lack of consideration led to the retaliation
by several foreign states in the form of “blocking statutes” to prevent the exercise of
jurisdiction by US courts.64
due to these criticisms, the “effects doctrine” was eventually modified into the
“jurisdictional rule of reason” by the Court of Appeals in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America.65 Here, Bank of America was alleged to have conspired to keep
Timberlane out of the Honduran lumber business.66 In assessing whether the US could
exert jurisdiction, a three-part test was devised. To determine whether a court could
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, first, the alleged restraint has to have had an
actual intended effect on American foreign commerce; second, the effect has to have
been sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and therefore
be a civil violation of the antitrust laws; and third, the interests of and links to the
us have to have been sufficiently strong vis-à-vis those of other nations to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority.67
Yet, despite the attempts to balance these interests through the modified doctrine,
criticisms still arose. In Laker Airways v. Sebena, Belgian World Airlines, the Court
emphasized that the balancing of domestic and foreign interests did not fall under
the Court’s authority but rather under the executive branch.68In this case, the US
and the united Kingdom faced jurisdictional conflict involving the regulation of air
transportation. the Court noted that the modified doctrine carried both practical
problems, in which discovery and requests for submissions were requested by
political branches, and theoretical problems, where international law does not
require one jurisdiction to be more reasonable than the other.69Now, having analyzed
the contributions of judicial decision-making, the focus turns to the contributions of
legislation from the US.
In addition to the concerns aboutinternational comity and foreign interference,
Judge Hand’s statement also gave rise to disagreements among US Courtsabout whether
the “substantial effect”requirement applied to the US in order to impose liabilities.70
These disagreements were eventually addressed through the introduction of the
1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).71 The FTAIA introduced the
test of “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” in US trade or commerce
for the Sherman Act to apply to foreign nations.72
The requirement of “substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect” has been
further qualified by the courts to mean that the effects must occur within a us
territory. Furthermore, a foreign plaintiff cannot sue for damages in a US court for
63
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harm suffered outside the US. This is evident in Hoffman-la Roche v. Empagran SA
(Empagran), where the Court decided that harm suffered outside of the US could
not be brought to US courts.73 The Empagrancase involved a worldwide conspiracy to
fix the prices of vitamins. While some of the purchasers affected by the price-fixing
cartel were American and some were foreign, the Court focused its attention on
foreign purchasers who did not purchase any vitamins in the US and whether it could
exercise jurisdiction in those circumstances.74 However, the possibility is left open for
cases where the harm to foreign states and domestic harm is inseparable.75
Regarding the definition of “substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect,” the united
States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued
guidelines to interpret the FTAIA, titled the Antitrust Guidelines for International
Enforcement and Cooperation, which contains illustrations and court-defined terms.
although the Courts have not defined “direct effect, ”the ftaia offers certain
instructive examples. for instance, anticompetitive effects such as artificial inflation
of prices and artificial limits on volume in the us marketplace were sufficient to
fulfill the requirement of “substantial, direct and foreseeable” elements.76 However,
in Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc, the court found that worldwide anticompetitive
actions with a ripple effect in the us market did not fulfill the “direct effect” element.77
Here, the Plaintiff alleged a spillover effect on domestic commerce as a result of
alleged worldwide price-fixing and market division agreements.
“Substantial effect” may refer to the size of the affected market and the relative
harm of the anticompetitive foreign conduct.78 In Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp, the plaintiff, an American telecommunications company,
identified substantial effect toward its own and other businesses by characterizing
the relevant US export market and the plaintiff’s revenue.79 In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was violating US antitrust laws for restraining the export
market for US telephone services to Mexico. The defendant attempted to protect
its monopoly over Mexican phone services by disconnecting the lines used by the
plaintiff.80Generally, under the FTAIA, jurisdiction would be found where injury was
caused to “the market or to competition in general, not merely injury to individuals
or individual firms.”81 However, in cases where the market has a limited number of
competitors, an exception exists where injury toward a single company is deemed to
cause injury to the entire market.
“Reasonably foreseeable Effect ”has been less explicitly defined by Courts in the
73
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context of the FTAIA.82 However, this element is understood to replace the required
element of intent.83 In Animal Science Prods, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp.,84 the plaintiff
was a domestic purchaser of magnesite who purchased from Chinese producers and
exporters alleged to have fixed the price of magnesite exported to and sold in the us.
Here, the Appeal Court interpreted the term “reasonably foreseeable” to mean that
the adverse effects toward the domestic market were foreseeable to an objectively
reasonable person.85 Practically, foreign conduct producing substantial effects in the
United States is likely to satisfy the reasonable foreseeability requirement.86
D. Development of the Extraterritoriality Principle in EU Competition Law
As one of the largest and most active economies in the world, it is unsurprising
that the guardians of competition law in the EU have, in recent years, applied
their competition law extraterritorially to punish infringing firms located outside
of the EU.87 What is perhaps surprising is that the ECJ, or the Commission for that
matter,88 has never explicitly stated that the extraterritoriality principle applies in EU
competition law. Even in landmark cases where the ECJ has extended the reach of its
jurisdiction to punish non-EU undertakings,89 it has never specifically referred to the
extraterritoriality principle.
One likely reason behind the Court’s reluctance to explicitly adopt such a position,
let alone to recognize the US’s “effects doctrine,” is because during the 1990s, the
political elites of Europe fervently criticized the US antitrust authorities’ application of
the doctrine, especially when it was used against European companies.90 Instead, the
Court tactfully used two doctrines to extend its jurisdiction extraterritorially without
having to depart from the territoriality principle; namely, the “single economic entity
doctrine” and the “implementation doctrine.”91
For the two decades since their inception, these two doctrines have proven
sufficient for the Court to base its jurisdiction on to find infringements of article 101
or Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union(TFEU) against
non-EU undertakings.92However, it was only until recently, in 2017,93 that the ECJ
82
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finally expressly dealt with the extraterritorial application of Eu law and specifically
with the application of the “qualified effects doctrine” under EU competition law.
Hence, the following analysis will be divided into three corresponding sub-parts to
discuss each of the aforementioned doctrines; namely, the single economic entity
doctrine, the implementation doctrine, and the qualified effects doctrine.
1. Single Economic Entity Doctrine
the ECJ first used the single economic entity doctrine to impute liability to non-Eu
undertakings in the Dyestuffs case.94 In that case, three non-EU dyestuffs manufacturers
were found to have engaged in a price fixing cartel to increase the worldwide prices
of dyestuffs. The cartel parties (Geigy, Sandoz, and ICI) were located outside of EU;
however, they had subsidiaries who sold their products in the EU. The question in
that case was whether the overseas parent companies were liable for infringement
of EU competition law, considering that the parent companies and their subsidiaries
had separate legal personalities. The Court looked beyond the facade of separate
legal personalities and held that a subsidiary’s separate legal personality was not
enough to exclude its parent companies from liability.95 In fact, parent companies are
liable for the anticompetitive actions of its subsidiaries where the subsidiary “does
not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out […] the
instructions given to it by the parent company.”96 In such a situation, notwithstanding
their separate legal personalities, the parent company and its subsidiaries are, in fact,
acting as a “single economic entity.”97
The Court subsequently held that the crucial issuein determining the existence of
a single economic entity depends on whether the parent company exercises “decisive
influence” over its subsidiary.98in assessing the issue of decisive influence, the
Court considered the “economic, organizational and legal links” between the parent
company and the subsidiary.99 Moreover, if the parent company owns all the shares in
the subsidiary, then this creates a rebuttable presumption that the parent company
does exercise decisive influence over the subsidiary.100Hence, in the Dyestuffs case, the
Court finally held that the three parent companies were liable for violating article 101
tfEu, since they were able to exercise decisive influence over the selling prices set by
their subsidiaries.101
2. Implementation Doctrine
although the single economic entity doctrine allowed the Court to significantly
extend the reach of their jurisdiction to non-EU undertakings through their
subsidiaries, the doctrine is still limited. One obvious limitation is when none of the
undertakings involved in the anticompetitive activity has an established subsidiary in
the EU. This was the issue that the ECJ had to deal with in the Wood Pulp I case.102In
that case, the Court had to decide whether the Commission could exercise jurisdiction
94
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over wood pulp producers who had no subsidiaries or branches in the EU.103 The
Commission initially held that they had jurisdiction over the undertakings due to
the anticompetitive effects that the concerted practice caused in the EU market.104On
appeal, the ECJ agreed with the Commission, but used a different reasoning to justify
their jurisdiction over the undertakings: “if the applicability of prohibitions laid down
under competition law were made to depend on the place where the agreement […] was
formed, the result would obviously be to give undertakings an easy means of evading
those prohibitions. The decisive factor is therefore the place where it is implemented.”105
Hence, the Court found reason to establish jurisdiction because the pricing agreement
was “implemented” in the EU; it was immaterial whether they had recourse to
subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents or branches to affect their sales in the EU.106
The implementation doctrine and the Woodpulp case have been cited by the
Commission to expand its jurisdiction extraterritorially in a number of subsequent
cases, including the Amino Acids case, where it fined us, Japanese and Korean
companies for engaging in a cartel for amino acids.107 However, the doctrine was also
criticized by some commentators, because after the Woodpulp case, the threshold
for the application of the doctrine had been lowered so that even the “mere sale” of
goods in the Eu would be deemed sufficient to satisfy the threshold.108 This risked
contradicting established principles in private international law such as “it does
not constitute a sufficiently close and relevant link with the regulating State that is
compelling enough to justify jurisdiction on its part.”109 Nonetheless, when it comes to
business competition, the predominant means of that competition is through the sale
of goods or services. Indeed, when we consider some of the most harmful violations
of competition law, such as price fixing cartels, it is indubitable that the first market
that the cartel will harm will be the market where such cartelized goods are sold. In
this respect, it does not seem unreasonable that the threshold for implementation,
and as a result jurisdiction, could include the “mere sale” of goods.

3. Qualified Effects doctrine
Despite being criticized for the breadth of its application, a closer look at the
implementation doctrine reveals that there are still a number of anticompetitive
activities that do not fall under its reach. The most obvious examples are conducts
which are characterized by an unlawful omission, such as a boycott or refusal to
deal.110 In such cases, it could not be argued that the undertakings are “implementing”
anticompetitive agreement or conduct because the undertakings are not actively
engaged in an economic activity; rather it is their refusal to conduct such activities
that is the source of the violation. The problem with this situation is that it is possible
that those same omissions could result in anticompetitive effects within the market.
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Clearly, it would be highly detrimental to competition if such harmful business
practices escaped antitrust scrutiny merely because the undertakings’ actions were
not considered “implemented.”This was precisely the conundrum the ECJ had to deal
with in the Intel case.
in its long-awaited decision, the ECJ finally addressed the issue of the
extraterritorial application of EU competition law in the Intel judgment of 6 September
2017,111including the burning question of whether EU law applies the “effects
doctrine.”The case concerned two agreements between Intel and Lenovo, which
formed part of Intel’s global strategy to foreclose its only rival, AMD, from the x86
CPu market. the first agreement concerned a financial incentive for lenovo to delay
the launch of two AMD-equipped products on the worldwide market. The second
agreement involved Intel’s rebate program conditioned upon the exclusive purchase
of Intel CPUs for Lenovo’s laptops. The jurisdictional issue that arose in the case was
based on the fact that the agreements were concluded between a US (Intel) and a
Chinese company (Lenovo). Together, they regulated the sales of goods produced
and sold outside of the EU, to be later assembled into computers manufactured in
China.112Furthermore, the agreement foreclosed another US company (AMD) from
selling its products into the Chinese market. Based on these facts, Intel argued that
the Commission did not have jurisdiction because the agreements were neither
implemented in the EU nor did they have any effects in the EU market.
to address these jurisdictional questions, the Court first held that the qualified
effects doctrine does apply in EU law, because it “pursues the same objective [as the
implementation doctrine], namely preventing conduct which, while not adopted within
the EU, has anticompetitive effects liable to have an impact on the EU market.”113
Thus, regarding the standing of the two doctrines, the Court stated that both the
implementation and the qualified effects doctrines were valid, and that they are
alternative in nature.114furthermore, the Court confirmed that the qualified effects
doctrine allows for the extraterritorial application of EU competition law when the
conduct has “foreseeable, immediate and substantial effects” on the market.115
In applying these criteria to the facts, the Court noted that when assessing the
nature of the effects, it was necessary to consider the conduct “viewed as a whole,”116
and not merely to look at each element of the conduct separately. The Court cautioned
that the consequence of doing the latter“would lead to an artificial fragmentation
of comprehensive anticompetitive conduct, capable of affecting the market structure
within the EEA, into a collection of separate forms of conduct which might escape
the European Union’s jurisdiction.”117 in other words, the qualified effects doctrine
requires a comprehensive analysis on the conduct viewed holistically.
In the Intel case, the determinative factor for the Court in assessing the qualified
effects test was on the fact that each of Intel’s agreements formed part of a larger
strategy aimed at ensuring that none of Lenovo’s products would be equipped with
AMD CPUs on the global market, including the EU.118 The Court found that such a
strategy had immediate and substantial effects on the European market. Furthermore,
111
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the Court clarified that “it is sufficient to take account of the probable effects of conduct
on competition in order for the foreseeability criterion to be satisfied.”119 In conclusion,
the Court found the qualified effects to be satisfied, and hence it had jurisdiction over
the case.
The ECJ’s decision in the Intel case marked a significant and important development
to the application of the extraterritoriality principle in EU competition law for two
reasons. First, the decision made it absolutely clear that EU competition law does
embrace the qualified effects doctrine. in this regard, the Court has finally aligned
the EU’s extraterritorial application of its competition rules with that of many other
States who apply the “effects doctrine,” most notably the US.120 Secondly, the judgment
has provided guidance as to the criteria of the qualified effects doctrine, namely that
it must be “foreseeable, immediate and substantial.”121As noted by one commentator,
“the Court’s ruling should, in principle, enhance the coherence, clarity and predictability
of the system of public enforcement of EU competition rules.”122
E. Development of the Extraterritoriality Principle in the Competition Law of
other ASEAN Countries
1. Singapore
Singapore had already had its Competition Act since 2004. Since then, the
competition law in Singapore developed very rapidly. In less than three years, it
managed to establish policy and legislative foundationsand aregulatory agency
under the Ministry of Trade and Industry.123In 2005, the Competition Commission of
Singapore (CCS) was established. Its main function is to generate policy statements
which supplement the Competition Act. On 1 January 2006, the provisions on the
prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and dominant position went into effect.
Meanwhile, the merger control provisions were expected to be applicable within the
following 12 months.124
Stipulations on the extraterritoriality principle are already regulated in the
Competition Act. Section 33 (1) extends the applicability of Singapore’s competition
laws to agreements entered into or conduct engaged in outside Singapore or by
parties who are outside Singapore.125The CCS has the duty to determine whether such
agreement or conduct affects the competition in Singapore. If it does, the commission
may also take action upon the infringing parties. Ong mentioned that a special feature
of Singapore’s Competition Act is the explicit mention of the extraterritoriality
principle. Meanwhile, some other jurisdictions hide behind subtle terminologies such
as single economic entity, implementation, or effects doctrines.126
Furthermore, section 47 of the Competition Act applies the extra-territoriality
principle to the abuse of dominant position because Section 47(3) mentions that
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dominant position means a dominant position within Singapore or elsewhere.127This
means that a foreign firm that has a dominant position, even if not in singapore, is at
risk of violating Section 47 of Singapore’s Competition Act provided that it abuses its
dominant position either through its conduct in Singapore or through conduct whose
adverse impact affects the competition in Singapore.128
The exercise of the territoriality principle can be found in the Ball Bearings case;
this was the first international cartel case the CCs dealt with. the case involved four
Japanese bearings manufacturers and their Singapore subsidiaries. The Japanese
companies are competitors in producing ball bearings. It was later discovered that the
parent companies discussed and agreed on sales prices on the bearings and sold them
to aftermarket customers in Singapore in order to maintain their individual market
share and protect their individual profits and sales. the CCs found that the companies’
agreement amounted to price fixing and exchange of strategic information. for that
reason, the four Japanese companies and their subsidiaries were held to be jointly and
severally liable for having infringed on Section 34 of Singapore’s Competition Act.129
2. Malaysia
Malaysia introduced both The Competition Act and The Competition Commission
Act in 2010. The former came into force on 1 January 2011, while the latter came
into force on 1 January 2012. These acts basically prohibit1) agreements which have
the object or effect of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting competition
in Malaysia; and 2) conduct which amounts to abuse of a dominant position in
the Malaysian market.130 Section 3 of the Malaysian Competition Act implicitly
acknowledges the extraterritorial principle as it mentions that the competition law
applies to any commercial activity both within and outside Malaysia.131 It further
explains that the law shall be applicable to commercial activity conducted outside
Malaysia that has an effect in Malaysia’s market.132
There is a similarity between Malaysia’s and Singapore’s Competition Act regarding
the extraterritoriality principle. Both countries not only exercise jurisdiction toward
anti-competitive agreements and conducts within their territories, but also toward
those conducted outside their territories, which may bring adverse impact to the
competitive atmosphere of each country. To this date, there have been no cases
showing the application of the extraterritoriality principle in Malaysia.

IV. FINDING THE BEST IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF INDONESIA’S
COMPETITION LAW
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When considering which interpretation of the extraterritoriality principle is best
suited for indonesia’s competition law, the first and most important thing to do is to
be faithful to the verbatim wording used in the Antimonopoly Bill. Accordingly, it must
be reiterated that the Antimonopoly Bill uses the phrase “which has an effect on the
Indonesian economy” (“yang mempunyaidampakterhadapperekonomian Indonesia” in
Indonesian)133 as a basis for extending the law’s jurisdiction extraterritorially. Based on
this wording, it could be reasonably ascertained that the drafters of the Antimonopoly
Bill had intended for Indonesia’s new law to adopt the “effects doctrine,” as the word
“effect” (“dampak” in indonesian) was precisely used to broaden the definition of
“business actors” under Article 1(4) of the Bill.
Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, there is no need to consider the single
economic entity or the implementation doctrinefurther because they are outside the
scope of the effects doctrine. Furthermore, it could also be argued that if Indonesia does
adopt the effects doctrine, then the two other doctrines would be superfluous, since
any situation that could be defined under these two doctrines would automatically fall
within the scope of the effects doctrine.134 For example, if the anticompetitive conduct
involved an Indonesian subsidiary of a foreign company, then it would necessarily
affect the Indonesian market since both are participants in the market. Also, if the
anticompetitive conduct was implemented in Indonesia, then it would undoubtedly
cause anticompetitive effects on the Indonesian economy as the conduct directly
harms competitors and consumers in the Indonesian market.
The question that must then be answered is: which version should be used to
interpret the effects doctrine for Indonesia’s Antimonopoly Bill? The US effects
doctrine or the Eu’s qualified effects doctrine?after analyzing the development of each
doctrine in depth, the authors have come to conclude that whichever interpretationis
used to base Indonesia’s implementation of the effects doctrine, it would in most cases
lead to the same result. The reason is that if we look carefully at the criteria for the
us’s original effects doctrine and the Eu’s qualified effects doctrine, we can see that
they are substantively almost identical to one another. The US uses the test of “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect,”135while the EU uses the condition
of“foreseeable, immediate and substantial effects.”136When compared side by side, the
resemblance is striking: the US test of “direct” parallels the EU test of “immediate,”
while the tests of “substantial” and “foreseeable” are retained in the EU test. Hence,
whichever interpretation is used, it would ultimately lead to the conclusion that the
effect must be qualified by those three characteristics: direct/substantial, immediate,
and foreseeable.
Despite these similarities, however, it is still necessary to determine the best
interpretation for Indonesia’s competition regime. This is because when a legal
system adoptsa legal principle or doctrine from another jurisdiction through legal
transplant, then it also necessarily adopts the surrounding existing norms to interpret
such principle or doctrine. In the context of Indonesia’s competition law, one of the
most pertinent examples to illustrate this fact is the transplant of the “per se” and
“rule of reason” doctrine to assess the illegality of conduct.137 Since these doctrines
originate from US antitrust law, whenever the KPPU or the Court need to apply these
doctrines in assessing a case, then it is inevitable that they would refer to US case laws
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in order to understand how the doctrine should be applied. In fact, even the KPPU
Guidelines refer to US case laws whenever they attempt to categorize conduct as a per
se or rule of reason violation.138
It is therefore important to adopt a doctrine where the surrounding body of existing
norms for interpreting the doctrine are sufficiently clear and consistent. Bearing this
in mind, the authors conclude that the best interpretation of the effects doctrine that
should be used in the Antimonopoly Bill is the US’s original effects doctrine. This is
because the surrounding norms that exist in the US to interpret the criteria of “direct,
immediate, and reasonably foreseeable,” are much clearer than those in the EU’s
qualified effects doctrine.
This is evident from the fact that there are existing norms in both US case law and
legislation which further clarify how each of the three criteria should be interpreted.139
Meanwhile, since the ECJ has only recently explicitly adopted the qualified effects
doctrine, there aren’t enough supporting norms that can help further interpret the
meaning of each criteria. In fact, some scholars have expressed concerns over the
Court’s Intel decision with regard to their analysis of the qualified effects doctrine
because “as far as the application of the implementation and qualified effects tests are
concerned, the judgment is somewhat less clear.”140Perhaps in the future when there
are cases that require the ECJ to answer difficult questions on the extraterritoriality
of EU competition law, then the Court may well give a better explanation for the
implementation of the qualified effects doctrine. However, as of now, the us’s
development of case law and legislation providesthe most satisfactory guidelines on
the implementation of the effects doctrine.

V. CONCLUSION
With the dawn of the AEC, Indonesia is entering a new chapter in the development
of its economy. The demands of a more interconnected regional economy require not
only Indonesia’s businesses to be ready to face competitive challenges; but it also
requires the Indonesian government to act as guardians of the competitive process
in the Indonesian market to protect it from anticompetitive conduct both within and
outside of its borders. In this respect, we can see that some of our neighbors are already
one step ahead, as Singapore and Malaysia have both applied the extraterritoriality
principle to their respective competition acts. Indonesia, on the other hand, needs to
swiftly amend its competition law because the territoriality doctrine that is contained
in law no. 5 of 1999 significantly hampers the KPPu’s efforts to enforce the law
against foreign anticompetitive conduct.
It is therefore important for Indonesia to move forward and to expand the
jurisdictional scope of its competition law extraterritorially. From the wording of
Article 1(4) of the Antimonopoly Bill, it is clear that legislators intend to adopt the
effects approach. However, what is still unclear is how the term “effect” (dampak
in Indonesian) should be interpreted. This is where taking inspiration from the US
approach would be useful, as their most recent developments have further qualified
the effects doctrine with the criteria of “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable.”
If these criteria are not met, then the US Courts and competition authorities cannot
138
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exercise jurisdictionin order to conform with the principles of international comity.
It would be wise for Indonesia’s legislators to take inspiration from this approach in
order to create greater clarity for the application of the extraterritoriality principle in
Indonesia.
The most critical recommendationis for the government to integrate the
qualifications of the us’s approach to the effects doctrine into the antimonopoly Bill.
this can be done by either inserting the qualifications directly in the wording of article
1(4) of the Antimonopoly Bill, or by including an explanation inside the elucidation to
the article. This is important to ensure certainty in the interpretation of the doctrine.
The risks of not qualifying the degree of “effect” would be to have too broad of an
interpretation. In which case, valuable taxpayer money and resources might be used
to prosecute foreign conduct which may not otherwise have a significant effect on the
Indonesian economy, and which in turn may strain political relations with the State in
which the foreign business actor is located. the qualifications of “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable” (langsung, segera dan mendatang in Indonesian) would
provide the most balanced approach.
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